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Ethnicity, inequality, and perceived electoral fairness 
 
Abstract: Establishing electoral legitimacy across the population is vital for democratic 
stability, yet in contrast to other measures of political support, perceived electoral fairness has 
received scant scholarly attention. Moreover, while research into other measures of political 
support has shown that they differ by both ethnicity and socio-economic status, no study 
examines both at once, potentially overlooking important interrelationships between the two 
variables. This paper combines data from the Ethnic Power Relations project and the World 
Value Survey to examine respondents’ perceptions of electoral fairness according to their 
ethnic group’s access to power, their individual socio-economic status, and the intersection of 
these two. It finds that one’s ethnic group’s political status does affect perceived fairness, but 
that the effect interacts strongly with one’s socio-economic status. Poorer members of non-
represented ethnic groups have significantly lower perceptions of fairness, while richer 
members’ perceptions do not differ from those of represented groups. The results suggest a 
levelling effect of socio-economic status on ethnic inequalities. 




Establishing political legitimacy across the population is one of the main political challenges 
in ethnically diverse societies. Political support is vital for democratic stability, as its lack may 
lead to a sense of disconnection or political alienation from the political process (Citrin et al. 
1975), which in turn may lead citizens to opt out of or even rebel against that process (Muller, 
Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Norris 2011). Yet various studies show that political support is 
significantly and considerably lower among members of minority groups than majority groups  
(Karakoç 2013; Silver and Dowley 2000; Bühlmann and Hänni 2012; Ehin 2007; Hänni 
2017b).1 One of the main reasons for this discrepancy in political support is thought to be 
minorities’ lack of representation in political office, as representation arguably enhances 
communication between representatives and represented, increases citizens’ trust in 
government and hence political legitimacy, and raises feelings of belonging to the polity 
(Mansbridge 1999; Williams 2000).  
A second set of studies focuses not on ethnicity but on socio-economic status as determinant 
of political support and consistently shows a negative association (e.g. Anderson and Guillory 
1997; Anderson and Singer 2008; Zmerli and Castillo 2015): less well-off individuals perceive 
that the system they live in does not work as well for them as for others, and are hence less 
satisfied with or less trusting in this system. That is, just as for the link between ethnicity and 
political support, the mechanism between socio-economic status and political support is 
assigned to representation. Despite this commonality, there is very little overlap between the 
two sets of studies: those examining the ethnicity–support link either do not discuss socio-
economic status at all or merely include it as control variable, along with the “usual suspects” 
age, gender, and education.2 Yet ethnic groups are by no means homogenous. Not only may 
 
1 To enhance readability, we use the term “minority” to refer to a socially and politically disadvantaged 
group, no matter its numbers. 
2 One exception is Hänni (2017b), though note that she uses economic status at the group level and thus does 
not consider economic differences within ethnic groups.  
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group members differ in, amongst others, their socio-economic status, but they may also assign 
differing levels of importance to their ethnic group’s access to power (e.g. Mansbridge, 1999). 
Our analysis thus goes beyond the simple association between ethnicity and political support, 
or socio-economic status and political support, and examines their intersection in order to 
account for the socio-economic heterogeneity within ethnic groups.3  
We do so for a dimension of political support not previously examined: perceptions of electoral 
fairness. By examining evaluations of a political process, rather than of institutions or actors 
per se, we can more confidently infer whether ethnic or socio-economic status colours 
individuals’ perception of institutions and the output they produce, or political support more 
widely. Moreover, perceived electoral fairness is of interest in its own right. The legitimacy of 
the electoral process as a core exercise of the democratic process is crucial for the consolidation 
of democracy and substantial for political support as such. Citizens who doubt the fairness of 
elections show lower levels of political support more generally (Norris 2014); are less likely to 
vote (Birch 2010); and more likely to participate in electoral protests or even violence (Norris, 
Frank, and Martínez i Coma, Ferran 2015). Yet research on which factors affect citizens’ 
perceptions of electoral fairness emerged only recently, and few studies focus on individual- 
rather than context-level determinants (Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015; Flesken and Hartl 
2018; Wolak 2014). To our knowledge, none so far has focused explicitly on the link between 
ethnicity and perceptions of electoral fairness (but see Norris 2004), let alone its intersection 
with socio-economic status, despite its importance for legitimacy in diverse societies. 
 
3 The interrelationship between ethnic diversity and economic inequality has previously been pointed out 
with regard to group-level inequality in the literature on civil conflict; see e.g. Ostby (2008) and Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011). However, this literature is concerned with aggregate patterns of a 




We conduct this analysis in a cross-sectional comparison of 21 countries, combining the latest 
wave of the World Values Survey (WVS; 2016) with data on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR; 
Vogt et al., 2015).4 We find that while ethnic groups’ political status indeed affects perceptions 
of electoral fairness, it interacts strongly with individual-level socio-economic status: the effect 
of being a member of a non-represented ethnic group on people’s perceptions of electoral 
fairness depends on each member’s socio-economic status. Poorer members have significantly 
lower perceptions of fairness, while richer members do not differ in their perceptions from 
members of represented ethnic groups. These findings confirm that different social and political 
cleavages do not only act individually but that they intersect in their effect on political attitudes.  
Going beyond the empirical findings, this analysis also makes a methodological contribution 
to the cross-country comparison of ethnicity in political attitudes: we translate constructivist 
theory of ethnicity into practice by taking into account the political relevance of ethnicity and 
combining survey and country-level datasets in a novel fashion. Importantly, instead of 
institutions as proxies for representation, we consider ethnic representation itself, which is not 
only more accurate in comparative analysis but also circumvents the problem of endogeneity.  
The following sections elaborate on the hypotheses on how and why different cleavages affect 
perceptions of electoral fairness and discuss ethnicity in the analysis of political attitudes in 
cross-country comparisons. We then present the data and methods and examine the effects of 
ethnic and socio-economic status as well as their interaction, before discussing the findings.  
Determinants of electoral fairness 
A growing literature on political attitudes in ethnically diverse societies demonstrates a gap in 
political support between ethnic majorities and minorities. For example, Kurds in Turkey show 
 
4 Data collection for the sixth wave of the WVS took place between 2010 and 2014. We matched the survey 
data with the EPR data for the respective (or closest available) year.  
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lower levels of trust in domestic institutions (Karakoç 2013) and Russian-speakers in Estonia 
and Latvia report lower levels of regime support (Ehin 2007) than their respective titular ethnic 
groups. In comparative analysis, Silver and Dowley (2000) find for a number of political 
attitudes that differences between ethnic groups within countries are substantially larger than 
differences between countries. Similar minority–majority gaps are found in political 
involvement, engagement, and efficacy, confidence in institutions, satisfaction with 
democracy, and pride in belonging to the nation (Norris 2004; Elkins and Sides 2007; Banducci 
and Karp 2008; Bühlmann and Hänni 2012; Ruiz-Rufino 2013; Ray 2018).  
One explanation for the minority–majority gap focuses on inequality in political representation 
between groups. Minorities’ lack of representation in political office impedes communication 
between representatives and represented, decreases minority citizens’ trust in government and 
hence political legitimacy, and lowers feelings of belonging to the polity (Mansbridge 1999; 
Williams 2000). Studies mainly from the USA confirm that minorities who are not represented 
by members of their own group show lower levels of political approval, efficacy, interest, and 
trust as well as higher levels of political alienation than those who are (Gay 2002; Pantoja and 
Segura 2003; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004). Following Bobo and Gilliam (1990), these 
links between representation and political attitudes and behaviour are termed the empowerment 
hypothesis.  
In this paper, we seek to examine whether the empowerment hypothesis extends to evaluations 
of electoral fairness. Electoral fairness has only recently become the focus of comparative 
research as integral part of procedural legitimacy, capable of reinforcing or undermining the 
democratic cycle of procedural legitimacy, accountability, satisfaction with democracy, and 
participation (Birch 2011; Norris 2014). While the different dimensions of political support 
and evaluations of electoral fairness are related, they are not commensurable but theoretically 
distinct (see also Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015) and should hence also be empirically treated 
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as such.5 Electoral fairness focuses on the democratic process itself, and its evaluations should 
hence be less influenced by the regime output – that is, the regime’s ability to “deliver the 
goods” – than other measures of political support. The closest alternative indicator of 
democratic process evaluations, satisfaction with democracy, is at least as much influenced by 
respondents’ satisfaction with regime output than with the process itself (Linde and Ekman 
2003; Norris 2011). In addition, electoral fairness relates to a more direct experience of the 
object the citizens are asked to evaluate (Wolak 2014; Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015), which 
should lead to more accurate, and hence less diverging, evaluations. 
However, the complexity of the electoral process – and of potential manipulations – makes 
truly accurate evaluations difficult (Birch 2011). In such complex circumstances, people tend 
to use cognitive shortcuts as a guide (see e.g. Fiske and Kinder 1981; Conover and Feldman 
1984). Applied to procedural fairness, Doherty and Wolak (2012), for example, show that when 
processes are clearly fair or unfair, people make unbiased assessments of procedural fairness, 
yet when the fairness of the process is ambiguous, they are more likely to use prior attitudes to 
inform their assessments. In this paper, we examine whether, and to what extent, one’s ethnic 
group’s political status may work as cognitive shortcut in evaluations of electoral fairness. If 
political support is a result of psychological mechanisms as described in the empowerment 
hypothesis, evaluations of the electoral process may be similarly coloured by a perceived lack 
of representation. Our first expectation is thus that dejected minority citizens perceive the 
electoral process to be less fair.  
But cognitive shortcuts may also take different forms. In the reasoning outlined so far, the 
implicit assumption was that ethnic group members have an essential identity that all members 
share and that is different to that of the respective majority group, and with which come shared 
 
5 This is substantiated by the rather weak correlations between electoral fairness and political trust (Pearson’s 
R2=0.26) as well as satisfaction with democracy (R2=0.23) in our data.  
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interests or worldviews which may affect political attitudes (Mansbridge 1999; Griffin 2014). 
Accordingly, the assumption is that one’s ethnic group’s political status does matter, and that 
it matters for everyone equally. Whether this is indeed the case, however, needs to be 
established empirically. Moreover, following the logic of cognitive shortcuts, ethnicity may 
not be the only demographic factor that affects one’s political outlook. 
Another factor that may act as cognitive shortcut in the evaluation of electoral processes is 
socio-economic status. While seminal research by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) introduced socio-
economic status as a major political cleavage, its intersecting effect with that of ethnicity are 
often overlooked, partly because scholars, especially in the United States, side with either the 
ethnicity or socio-economic status model of political participation and attitudes (e.g. Nelson 
1979; Junn 1999). However, this interaction is of particular interest in ethnically diverse 
societies as ethnic relations are often reinforced, if not defined, by socio-economic inequalities; 
yet to date the empirical focus is on group- rather than individual-level inequalities (Cederman, 
Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Ray 2018), thus implicitly homogenising ethnic groups.  
Research on political attitudes at the individual level in general has shown that socio-economic 
status and in particular income have a positive effect on perceptions of electoral fairness (Birch 
2008; Klassen 2014) as well as on related outcomes such as trust in political institutions, 
general political support, and political participation (Farrell and McAllister 2006; Singh, 
Karakoç, and Blais 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Zmerli and Castillo 2015; Anderson and 
Guillory 1997). Leighley and Nagler’s (1992, 2014) explanations for the impact of income on 
voter turnout can be translated to its impact on perceptions of electoral fairness: party 
manifestos and government programmes tend to refer to groups of citizens in terms of income, 
rather than, for example,  education or occupational status, and the main mode of interaction 
of the average citizen with the state is via taxation and distribution. That is, income is a highly 
salient demographic factor in both political participation and evaluations. Moreover, higher 
 
8 
income leads to higher stakes and hence increased engagement (Leighley and Nagler 1992; 
Leighley and Nagler 2014). And as policy makers are more responsive to voters than non-
voters (Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995), those with higher income may perceive 
better representation, which in turn affects their evaluation of the process as a whole. These 
considerations lead to two expectations. First, we expect that income is positively correlated 
with perceptions of electoral fairness. Second, the especially high salience of income in the 
context of elections may counteract that of ethnic group status, such that the negative effect of 
a lack of ethnic representation on perceptions of electoral fairness decreases with higher 
income. Before we describe the data used to test these hypotheses, we elaborate the role of 
ethnicity in the analysis of political attitudes. 
Ethnicity in the analysis of political attitudes 
The empowerment hypothesis – that representation increases political support among ethnic 
minority groups – motivated comparative research to determine whether more inclusive 
institutions can reduce the majority–minority gap in political support. Results are mixed: while 
Banducci and Karp (2008) as well as Ruiz-Rufino (2013) report the gap in a number of political 
attitudes to be smaller where minorities have greater access to power, Norris (2004) finds that 
more proportional, and hence more inclusive, electoral systems do nothing to reduce the gap 
in satisfaction with democracy. For feelings of national pride, Bühlmann and Hänni (2012) as 
well as Ray (2018) find the gap larger the greater political inequality, but Elkins and Sides 
(2007) find only mixed effects for inclusive institutions such as federalism and proportional 
representation. 
The inconsistent findings are at least in part due to diverging definitions of and inclusion 
criteria for ethnic minority and majority groups. For example, for Uruguay, Elkins and Sides 
(2007) do not identify a relevant ethnic distinction and hence exclude the country from 
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analysis; Banducci and Karp (2008) do include it and count mestizo, indigenous, and black 
Uruguayans as minorities; while Staerklé et al. (2010) count the same as majorities and only 
Brazilians and Argentinians living in Uruguay as minorities. For the Ukraine, Elkins and Sides 
(2007) as well as Ruiz-Rufino (2013) identify Russians as a minority, while Norris (2004) 
counts them as majority. The groups in South Africa are varyingly Whites, Blacks, Coloureds, 
and Asians (Silver and Dowley 2000); Europeans, Xhosa, Zulu, Coloureds, and Asians (Elkins 
and Sides 2007); or South Africans and Indians (Staerklé et al. 2010). But perhaps the strongest 
discrepancy is visible for Poland: Elkins and Sides (2007) again do not identify any relevant 
ethnic distinction; Ruiz-Rufino (2013) lists Byelorussians as minority; Staerklé et al. (2010) 
Muslims; and Norris (2004) the rural population.  
The diverging categorisations result because ethnicity is only rarely considered in the light of 
the underlying hypothesis – in this case empowerment through representation. Yet a vast 
literature on the socially constructed nature of ethnicity has taught us that ethnicity is not 
inherent in physical or cultural differences themselves but dependent on the context (e.g. Hale 
2004; Chandra 2012). Accordingly, if the aim is to examine the link between “ethnicity” and 
political attitudes, we need to define ethnicity in terms of those identity categories that are seen 
to matter in political life and could hence conceivably affect attitudes about political life.6 
Cultural or linguistic differences, for example, do not necessarily translate into politically 
relevant differences (see e.g. Chandra and Wilkinson 2008) – which differences are politically 
relevant depend on longer-term processes of social and political construction (see Chandra 
2012; Weber, Hiers, and Flesken 2016). This also implies that the relevant cleavage may vary 
from country to country. While in some countries it runs along skin colour, in others it runs 
along language or religion. In yet other countries, it is a combination of these attributes. These 
heterogenous outcomes of social-construction processes present problems for comparative 
 
6 For a related argument with regard to macro-level diversity indices, see also Posner (2004). 
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survey research, as not every survey has a ready-made “ethnicity” item in its demography 
section, and even where that is the case, the categories offered may not be along that dimension 
identified to be relevant for the hypothesis at hand. In the following, we describe how 
combining country- and individual-level data can address this problem. 
Operationalising ethnic group status 
To operationalise ethnicity, we take advantage of the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, a 
country-level dataset which codes ethnic groups with regard to both their political relevance 
and status (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Vogt et al. 2015). A group is coded as relevant 
“if at least one political organisation has claimed to represent its interests at the national level 
or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination” (Vogt et al. 2015, 3). In 
contrast to, for example, the Minorities at Risk (2009) dataset, the EPR hence also includes 
majority groups. 
Moreover, in contrast to the new All-Minorities at Risk dataset (Birnir et al. 2015), EPR also 
codes all groups according to their access to state power in a given year and thus along lines of 
representation. The coding distinguishes between seven status categories: monopoly, 
dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discriminated, or self-excluded (Vogt et al. 
2015). Groups in the first two categories rule alone, but in contrast to monopoly, dominance 
indicates some limited representation of other groups by “token” members. The senior and 
junior partner categories indicate that included groups share power in formal or informal 
power-sharing arrangements. Designation as senior or junior refers to a groups’ influence in 
the executive, irrespective of group size. Groups in the final three categories have no access to 
state power. Powerless groups lack representation or influence in central government, while 
discriminated groups are subject to active, deliberate, and directed discrimination in the 
political realm. Self-exclusion refers to groups who opted out of central government, instead 
 
11 
controlling a particular territory claimed to be independent from the state. We focus here on 
powerless groups and removed the self-exclusion and discriminated group categories from our 
analysis since members of such groups, by definition, participate either not at all or only in 
very limited ways in the electoral process.7 
To translate ethnic group status to the individual level for each country, we first used the EPR’s 
accompanying Atlas, which provides qualitative documentation on every country (see Vogt et 
al. 2015), as well as further case study literature to define the membership attributes (e.g. 
language, religion) for all relevant categories. In a second step, we used all pertinent 
demographic information provided in the WVS dataset – including the in-house coding of 
ethnicity, language spoken at home, religious denomination, and region where the interview 
was conducted – to categorise individual respondents as members of the respective groups.8 
Note that the response categories provided for the variable “ethnicity” in the WVS dataset are 
defined by each country team on a case-by-case basis and are hence by themselves not readily 
usable for cross-country comparative analyses. Note further that, in contrast to previous efforts 
(Hänni 2017b; Wimmer 2017), our categorisation is based on the combination of multiple 
attributes, rather than on only a single attribute per country (see Table 1).  
Finally, we assigned each respondent the status of their respective group in the respective year 
according to the EPR dataset. For example, in Georgia, respondents were coded by both a 
combination of language and religion: respondents speaking Armenian, Asirien, Azerbaijani, 
or Russian were coded as powerless since these are equivalent to the powerless language 
 
7 Respondents in these categories are few and hence unlikely to change the results even when included: 
Baluchis (n=44), Hindus (3), and Christians (1) in Pakistan and Malays (1) in Thailand.  
We also omit countries with only senior and junior partners, and with no powerless groups, since no 
comparison between politically included and politically excluded groups is possible. 
8 The variable names correspond to items X051, G016, X048, and F024 in the WVS dataset, respectively. 
Region was only relevant for coding in countries not covered in this paper, such as Ethiopia, Italy, Ghana, 
and Switzerland, and is hence not further detailed.   
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groups described in EPR at the time of the survey. Similarly, Muslim respondents were coded 
as powerless. Non-Muslim Georgian-speakers were coded as dominant group members. In 
Mexico, in contrast, skin colour is more important than religion or language in distinguishing 
between ethnic group statuses, resulting in the coding of mestizos as dominant, and Afro-
Mexicans and indigenous as powerless. Members of “other minorities” were omitted from the 
dataset since their non-identification makes it likely that they are not member of a politically 
relevant group, and that their group is very small.9 Respondents whose identity category could 
not be identified due to item non-response were also omitted.10  
We dichotomised the different relevant groups into “politically included” (i.e. monopoly, 
dominant, senior partner, junior partner) and “politically excluded” (powerless) to more clearly 
reflect whether members of this group are represented in power or not. While we acknowledge 
differences between power-sharing systems – those with senior and junior partners – and 
political systems with ethnic monopolies, the binary variable of inclusion and exclusion mirrors 
the empowerment hypothesis more adequately and is in line with the guiding principle of the 
EPR dataset (see also Vogt et al. 2015; Wimmer 2017). Table 1 lists upon which basis we 
assigned WVS survey respondents to the ethnic groups identified by the EPR project as 
politically relevant per country. Overall, we coded 22,085 respondents in 21 countries in this 
way.  
By translating the EPR categorisations of politically relevant ethnic groups from the aggregate 
to the individual level, we consider the result of the social construction of ethnic identity 
 
9 The removal of irrelevant ethnic groups led to the omission of a total of 458 individuals. More than half of 
these were respondents from Australia with “other European” (n=129) or various “Asian” backgrounds such 
as Chinese or Indian (101). Other groups include Ukrainians in Kazakhstan (23) or Turks in Kyrgyzstan (15) 
and various “other” in the single digits. 
10 Only 65, and hence comparatively few, individuals were omitted due to item non-response (in Uruguay 
22, Australia 20, Thailand 8, Kyrgyzstan 6, Taiwan 3, Colombia and Poland 2, Kazakhstan and Romania 1), 
making bias due to non-response highly unlikely.   
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categories at the time of the survey, for the relevant contexts. While individual-level attributes 
of respondents used are “essentialist”, they here only act as markers of membership in 
politically relevant ethnic groups. This approach allows considering the multidimensionality 
of ethnicity while ensuring comparability across countries; there is no need to take other 
country-level factors into consideration that may affect the political relevance of ethnic identity 
categories, such as the inclusiveness of political institutions: ethnic identity categories are 
endogenous to institutions (see also Chandra 2001). To reiterate, the main purpose of this paper 
is to examine whether (and if so, when) someone’s membership in an ethnic identity category 
widely considered to be of political relevance at the societal level indeed affects political 
attitudes at the individual level.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Data and methods  
Our dependent variable is perceived electoral fairness. The latest WVS data includes several 
questions to evaluate the fairness of the electoral process. Respondents were asked how often 
in the country’s elections votes are counted fairly; journalists provide fair coverage of elections; 
and election officials are fair. We hence conceive of electoral fairness as reflecting the overall 
process, not Election Day alone (Norris 2014; Atkeson, Alvarez, and Hall 2015).11 Responses 
to each item were coded from “very often” to “not at all often”. The three items show varying 
degrees of non-response. To minimise data loss and avoid introducing bias through listwise 
deletion (King et al. 2001), we use propensity-score matching to impute missing values (Austin 
2011). A principal component analysis confirms that the items load on one dimension (Table 
A1, online appendix), which is stable in all countries. For our dependent variable, we combine 
 
11 The electoral integrity battery in the WVS includes eight items. Norris (2013) and Flesken and Hartl (2017) 
both identify four items to load on the same factor: the described fairness items as well as “voters have 
genuine choice in the elections”. We do not include this item here since it may systematically vary with 
ethnic group status. 
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the three items into an index. We first reverse the coding such that higher numbers denote 
higher levels of perceived electoral fairness. We then weight each item by the share of squared 
component loadings derived from the component analysis and build a summative index (see 
OECD 2008). Like all following continuous measures, the index is rescaled to range from 0 
(here denoting low fairness) to 1 (high fairness). 
We described the operationalisation for one of our main independent variables – the 
representation of politically relevant ethnic groups – above. For our second independent 
variable we use perceived economic status as indicator for socio-economic status. The 
respective question in the WVS refers to perceived income group:  
“On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income 
group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to 
know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate 
number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that 
come in.” 
Respondents hence indicate their perceptions of their income group relative to others in their 
country. While these perceptions do not necessarily reflect one’s economic situation accurately 
– respondents tend to gravitate more to the lower end and middle of the scale – a growing body 
of literature (e.g. Piketty 1995; Benabou and Ok 2001; Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013) 
argues that perceptions of income are just as likely to affect political attitudes as income itself. 
Perceived economic status hence bears more political significance and entails more aspects 
than the objective material situation alone. 
Control variables 
Besides ethnic group and socio-economic status, one of the strongest indicators of political 
support is vote choice: survey respondents who voted for government parties score 
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significantly higher on a range of political attitudes (e.g. Anderson et al. 2005). The same holds 
for perceptions of electoral fairness (Wolak 2014; Flesken and Hartl 2018). We hence include 
a dummy for electoral win into our models: we code respondents as winners or losers according 
to whether they support government or opposition parties, respectively, at the time of the 
survey.12 We use party position in power rather than the number of votes or seats gained as this 
indicator is more comparable across different electoral and government systems. Moreover, 
supporters of a party which obtained the majority of votes but which remains in the opposition 
are, if anything, more likely to feel as losers of an election. 
We also include several other control variables that could affect the relationship between 
ethnicity and perceptions of electoral fairness. First, media consumption on politics matters for 
evaluations of electoral fairness (see also Coffé 2016): mediavores may be better informed 
about actual standards of electoral fairness and their evaluations hence less likely affected by 
ethnic group membership. The WVS asked respondents how often they use daily newspapers, 
TV news, radio news, or the internet to obtain information about what is going on in the 
country. We aggregate these items into an index of media attention, weighted by factor loadings 
from a factor analysis, and rescale it to range from 0 (no information source ever used) to 1 (all 
sources used daily).13 We complement this measure with one of political interest, a binary 
variable which indicates whether respondents are very or somewhat interested in politics, as 
opposed to not at all or not very interested.14 
 
12 For lack of a question on retrospective party support asking who the respondent voted for in the last 
election, we use the WVS prospective question E264, reading “If there were a national election tomorrow, 
for which party on this list would you vote?” Asking retrospectively rather than prospectively may yield 
substantively different results only if party support is very fluid, yet the literature attests to its relative 
stability (Schickler and Green 1997). Moreover, any change in vote choice is less likely to be affected by 
perceived electoral fairness than, say, more substantive disagreements with policy positions; citizens 
distinguish between assessment of specific governments and support for political institutions (Norris, 2011) 
and specifically confidence in the electoral process (Atkeson et al., 2015). 
13 For the factor analysis, see Table A2. 
14 Using the original four-category coding does not alter the results. 
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Second, perceptions of electoral fairness may also be affected by direct experiences of 
malpractice during the elections (Kerr 2013). We therefore include the following two items as 
controls: how often voters are bribed or threatened with violence at the polls. Since in these 
questions voters themselves are the objects of electoral unfairness, it is likely that their answers 
reflect their own experience or observations of their local environment rather than merely 
media reports. We include both items as dichotomous variables, with “not (at all) often” as 
reference category. 
Finally, we account for socio-demographic background beyond income. Ethnic group size may 
affect perceptions of electoral fairness, as members of larger but unrepresented groups may 
feel more strongly about their lack of representation than members of very small groups. In 
addition, Klassen (2014) finds that in general, older and male respondents are more likely to 
perceive elections to be fair than younger and female respondents. The effect of education is 
more mixed: in developing democracies, better educated respondents tend to perceive elections 
to be less fair than others, while in liberal democracies they tend to evaluate them to be fairer 
than others do. We include all three socio-demographic variables in the analysis: age is 
included as log; gender as a binary variable with male as the base category; and education as a 
nine-category variable ranging from no formal education to university degree, here treated as 
continuous variable. Descriptive statistics for all individual-level variables are listed in Tables 
A3 and A4, online appendix.  
Beyond individual-level variables we also consider how the country context may affect 
perceived electoral fairness, especially since the WVS includes a wide variety of countries. The 
following country-level factors have been argued to affect individual perceptions of electoral 
fairness: the level of socio-economic development, the actual level of electoral fairness, the 
level of democracy, regime stability, and the proportionality of the electoral system (e.g. 
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Anderson et al. 2005; Birch 2008; Coffé 2016).15 We operationalise socio-economic 
development with GDP per capita (World Bank 2016). We further operationalise electoral 
fairness with expert evaluations of electoral integrity (PEI; Norris et al. 2016) and level of 
democracy and regime stability with the respective measures from the Polity4 dataset (Polity 
Project 2015). Finally, we operationalise electoral system proportionality with the Gallagher 
Index of Proportionality (Gallagher 1991; Gallagher 2015).16 
To take into account the clustered nature of the data we use multilevel linear regression models 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002) with two levels (individuals clustered in countries) and random 
intercepts. The precise models are specified in the respective note fields of the results tables.17 
This approach has the added advantage that we can also include countries with only small 
numbers of excluded ethnic group members.18 
Analysis 
Table 2 reports the results of five models for perceived electoral fairness. Model 1 includes the 
control variables only, while Models 2 and 3 also provide the coefficients for members of 
excluded ethnic groups and income, respectively. Model 4 includes both ethnic group exclusion 
as well as income additively, while Model 5 presents the interaction of these two variables.  
 
15 Further factors noted to affect political support are the extent of corruption, freedom of the press, as well 
as regime type, that is, whether the country is a parliamentary or presidential democracy. We do not include 
the last in our model presented here as we are concerned with legislative elections and representation. 
However, including it in the model does not change the results substantively. We neither include corruption 
or freedom of the press here since both are highly correlated with other country-level variables like gross 
domestic product or perceived electoral integrity. Running alternative models with these variables provide 
very similar results to the ones presented here. 
16 For descriptive statistics and further information on the country-level variables, see Table A5. 
17 All, data analysis is conducted using R (R Core Team 2015). For the multilevel analyses, we use the 
package lme4 (Bates et al. 2015). 
18 Regardless of the relatively large average number of observations per country, the number of excluded 
ethnic group members are at times very small, not allowing for a simple comparative approach without 
considerable data loss.  
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Overall, supporting the opposition, the perception of bribes and threats, belonging to a larger 
ethnic group, and in some models higher education levels have a significant negative effect on 
perceived electoral fairness. In contrast, older respondents, those more informed and interested, 
and those living in richer societies perceive elections to be fairer. Gender as well as ethnic 
fractionalisation, perceived electoral integrity, the level of democracy, regime stability, and the 
proportionality of the electoral system do not affect perceptions of electoral fairness when 
controlling for GDP per capita. 
Being a member of an excluded ethnic group affects one’s perception of electoral fairness 
negatively (M2). However, the higher one’s income, the higher one’s perception of electoral 
fairness (M3). That is, our first two expectations on the individual effects of ethnic 
representation and income on perceptions of electoral fairness are supported. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Model 4 includes both ethnic group status and income. The results confirm those of the prior 
two models, showing that being a member of a politically excluded ethnic group does indeed 
have a significantly negative effect on perceived electoral fairness, above and beyond one’s 
socio-economic status or political affiliation.  
Model 5 includes the interaction effect between ethnic group status and income to test our 
expectation on the effect of competing cognitive shortcuts on evaluations of electoral fairness. 
Although the results are substantively the same as those of Model 4, we observe a substantive 
effect of the interaction in the saturated model. As the effect of the main variables of interest – 
ethnic group status, income, and their interaction – cannot be deduced from the table alone 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006), we illustrate the results in Figures 1 and 2.19  
 
19 Figures produced with R package interplot (Solt and Hu 2016). 
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Figure 1 shows that among the politically included population, income has a small but 
significant positive effect on perceptions of fairness (the confidence intervals do not cross 0). 
Among members of politically excluded ethnic groups, however, the effect of income on the 
perception of fairness is substantially and significantly higher from that of included ethnic 
groups. That is, ethnic representation and income indeed interact in their effect on perceptions 
of electoral fairness: higher income significantly heightens perception of fairness to a larger 
extent if one belongs to an excluded than to an included ethnic group.  
Subsequently, Figure 2 shows that the effect of being a member of an excluded ethnic group 
decreases with increasing income (the line approaches 0), until excluded respondents with 
average or higher than average incomes do not differ anymore from included respondents (the 
confidence interval encompasses 0). This in turn shows again the interaction effect of the two 
variables: economic disadvantage has a stronger detrimental effect on perceptions of electoral 
fairness for members of excluded groups than of included groups. And as the bar chart attests, 
most excluded respondents are in the lower income brackets. 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
These results are robust to changes in model specification: we find substantively similar results 
both when excluding senior and junior partners from the analysis (Table A6) and when using 
economic or life satisfaction rather than income as alternative measures of perceived advantage 
or disadvantage (Tables A7–8). We also considered the possibility that excluded groups with 
high income tend to be situated in countries with high electoral integrity and are hence more 
likely to evaluate elections as fair, while excluded groups with low income tend to be in 
countries with low electoral integrity, and that this may only be imperfectly captured by the 
multilevel model we use. We tested this possibility by running several independent-sample t-
tests for income levels according to ethnic group status within individual countries (Table A9). 
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Only Algeria, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand show highly significant differences in 
income between ethnic group status, and Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, and Peru marginally significant 
differences. There is no clear pattern according to levels of electoral integrity and the direction 
of differences in income: for example, although all four countries have low PEI scores, in 
Nigeria and Algeria minority income is higher, while in Brazil and Thailand, majorities 
reported higher income. We conducted sensitivity analyses, running the original model without 
each of these eight countries in turn, with results very similar to those in Table 2 (Table A10). 
We therefore discount the possibility of skewed distributions producing the overall result. 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper, we tested the empowerment hypothesis in comparative analysis to establish 
whether (and if so, when) someone’s membership in an ethnic identity category widely 
considered to be of political relevance at the societal level indeed affects political attitudes at 
the individual level. In doing so, we added three contributions to the literature examining 
political attitudes between ethnic minorities and majorities. First, we went beyond usual 
indicators of political support by extending the analysis to evaluations of the electoral process, 
a crucial factor of political support in democracies, and showed that perceptions of electoral 
fairness indeed vary by ethnic group’s access to power. However, second, we found that 
individual-level socio-economic status affects perceptions of electoral fairness, and it does so 
not only in addition to but in interaction with group-level representation, thus highlighting the 
heterogeneity within ethnic groups. Third, underlying our analysis is a constructivist 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of ethnic groups and their members (political 
relevance of ethnic groups and their access to power) that was directly informed by the 
hypothesis at hand (empowerment through representation).  
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Some limitations of the presented research lie, as with all secondary data analysis, in the 
constrains of the data available. While WVS country coverage is one of the most 
comprehensive and diverse compared to other comparative survey data, our analysis is limited 
to those countries in which the electoral fairness battery was asked, and hence not based on a 
random selection of countries: the included countries are predominantly from the global south 
or relatively young democracies, which may raise questions about generalisability to, for 
example, countries from the global north. A more comprehensive analysis will be possible once 
WVS wave 7 data is available. In the meantime, a sensitivity analysis with different country 
subsamples (Table A10) raised no concerns regarding selection bias.  
Further constraints relate to the variables used. For example, socio-economic status, measured 
with perceived income stratification as done here, covers only one aspect of social status. 
Moreover, the literature on social status suggests that political attitudes are even more affected 
by status changes, that is, social mobility, than by status at a given time (Benabou and Ok, 
2001). Future research should put more emphasis on biographical trajectories of respondents 
to examine the effect of social status gains, losses, or stability at different levels for shaping 
political attitudes. The interaction of such trajectories with ethnic group membership would 
yield interesting findings regarding the effect of status gains and losses on political attitudes. 
Based on the cross-sectional analysis presented here, we would expect an aggravating effect of 
status loss for minority groups’ political support.  
Moreover, while we advocate a constructivist understanding of ethnicity, we acknowledge that 
this is not always straightforward in practice as the coding relies on the data available and is 
thus limited to the characteristics of the variables provided (ethnicity, language, region, and 
religion in WVS6). The data is also confined to the requirements of a representative sample, 
resulting in (partly) very small numbers of ethnic minorities. More in-depth quantitative 
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analyses of ethnic groups would require oversampling of some groups to ensure the necessary 
statistical leeway.  
More broadly, this paper only considered whether or not relevant ethnic groups are represented 
in power. While this coding aligns with the empowerment hypothesis, it may well be the case 
that minority citizens do not only take into consideration whether but also how well they are 
being represented when evaluating the political system (see also Hänni 2017a). The EPR 
dataset aims to take the extent of ethnic representation into account, yet the data is not designed 
to cover differences in the form of representation (Pitkin 1972) across countries. At the heart 
of the empowerment hypothesis as well as the EPR data set lies descriptive representation, 
which we extended here by measuring aspects of substantive representation at the individual 
level through socio-economic status. However, we could not capture, for example, symbolic or 
cultural representation at the group-level as championed by multiculturalists. These other forms 
of representation might be particularly significant, as the interaction effects indicate a kind of 
trade-off between the different forms of representation, with the importance of descriptive 
representation at the group level decreasing as substantive representation at the individual level 
increases. However, the effect of cultural representation on the perception of electoral 
processes is beyond the scope of this paper.  
The paper and its findings speak to several different literatures. First, it speaks to the – to date 
limited – literature on the salience of ethnicity in the electoral process. While electoral 
competition may well increase the salience of ethnicity (e.g. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), 
this paper shows that it is necessary to also take other social groupings into consideration. 
Michelitch (2015) arrives at a similar conclusion after examining the salience of both ethnicity 
and partisanship during electoral competition in Ghana. Second, our interaction effect also 
links to the discussion sparked by economists like Piketty (1995) and others (Benabou and Ok 
2001; Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz 2013) on social status: it suggests that social status, 
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expressed as perceived position on an income distribution, can become a “self-fulfilling belief” 
(Piketty 1998) and effectively change political attitudes.  
This leads us, third, to the political psychology literature and in particular to schema theory. 
Following the underlying assumptions of the empowerment hypothesis, it is one’s experience 
of the political process that shapes one’s outlook on politics – it is both the environment and 
the perceiver that determine to what extent social groups affect political thinking (Conover 
1988). With the data at hand we cannot determine whether this is due to, for example, a 
cognitive effect – that is, that the salience of ethnicity and hence its impact on political 
evaluations decreases the more the salience of economic advantage increases – or due to an 
emotional effect: social identity and schema theories stress that group membership is not 
equivalent to group identification, and that it is likely identification that has the strongest effects 
(Tajfel 1981; Conover 1988). Accordingly, one may argue that better-off non-represented 
respondents do not identify as strongly with their group, leading to evaluations 
indistinguishable from that of the represented population. This may be especially the case if 
ethnic groups are associated with social status; in Latin America, for example, it is observed 
that wealth has a “whitening” effect (e.g. Wade 2004). While the levelling effect of socio-
economic status on the observed ethnic group disparities found here suggest a similar 
mechanism, we leave the answers as to the psychological mechanisms to future research. In 
any case, our findings point to the importance of disentangling the term ethnicity and to 
considering reinforcing and cross-cutting effects of diverse social groupings at the individual 
level.  
Consequently, the empowerment hypothesis deserves more scrutiny: when accounting for the 
differences and diversity within the minority population, empowerment through representation 
does not hold across the board. This is not to say that such representation is not important, but 
that the heterogeneity of minority groups needs more recognition. Thus, we can understand the 
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interaction effect also as a problem of intersectionality. As Crenshaw (1991, 1242) points out: 
“The problem with identity politics is […] that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup 
differences.” In this vein, it is also important to look at the left-hand side of the interaction 
effect in Figure 2: low income and economic disadvantage reinforce the negative assessment 
of political processes among ethnic minorities. We thus argue that any notion of identity 
politics is fruitfully accompanied by policies focusing on economic disadvantage and social 
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Table 1: Politically relevant ethnic groups and identifying attributes 
 Ethnic Power Relations WVS indicators 
Country politically relevant group group status ethnicity language religion 
Algeria Arabs  included X X  
Berbers  excluded X X  
Australia Aborigines  excluded X   
Whites  included X   
Azerbaijan Azeri  included  X  
Lezgins  excluded  X  
Brazil Afro-Brazilians  excluded X   
Indigenous peoples  excluded X   
Whites  included X   
Colombia Afro-Columbians  excluded X   
Indigenous peoples  excluded X   
Whites/mestizos  included X   
Estonia Byelorussians  excluded  X  
Estonians  included  X  
Russians  excluded  X  
Ukrainians  excluded  X  
Georgia Armenians  excluded  X  
Azeri  excluded  X  
Georgians  included  X X 
Kazakhstan Germans  excluded X   
Kazakhs  included X   
Russian-speakers  excluded X   
Tatars  excluded X   
Uighur  excluded X   
Uzbeks  excluded X   
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyz  included X   
Russians  excluded X   
Uyghur  excluded X   
Uzbeks  excluded X   
Malaysia Chinese  included X X  
Dayaks  excluded X X  
East Indians  included X   
Kadazans  excluded X X  
Malays  included X X  
Mexico Afro-Mexicans  excluded X   
Mestizos  included X   
Other indigenous excluded X   
Nigeria Hausa-Fulani and Muslim 
Middle Belt  
included 
 X X 
Igbo  included  X  
Ijaw  included  X  
Ogoni  excluded  X X 
Tiv  excluded  X X 
Yoruba  included  X  
Pakistan Mohajirs  excluded  X  
Pashtuns  included  X  
Punjabi  included  X  
Sindhi  included  X  
     cont. 
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 Ethnic Power Relations WVS indicators 
Country politically relevant group group status ethnicity language religion 




X X  
Indigenous peoples (Andes)  excluded X X  
Whites/mestizos  included X   
Philippines Christian lowlanders  included X   
Indigenous  excluded X   
Moro  excluded   X 
Poland Byelorussians  excluded  X  
Germans  excluded  X  
Poles  included  X  
Roma  excluded  X  
Ukrainians  excluded  X  
Romania Germans  excluded X   
Hungarians  excluded X   
Roma  excluded X   
Romanians  included X   
Taiwan Indigenous/Aboriginal  excluded  X  
Mainland Chinese  included  X  
Taiwanese  included  X  
Thailand Hill Tribes  excluded X   
Shan  excluded X   
Thai  included X   
Ukraine Hungarians  excluded  X  
Romanians/Moldovans  excluded  X  
Russians  included  X  
Ukrainians  included  X  
Uruguay Afro-Uruguayans  excluded X   
Whites/mestizos  included X   
Note: Authors’ elaboration, using the EPR (Vogt et al. 2015) and WVS (2016) datasets, covering all 
countries that fielded questions on electoral fairness. Omitted are ethnic groups coded as irrelevant, 




Table 2: Determinants of perceived electoral fairness 
 M0 M1 M3 M4 M5 

















































































































































































































Note: NCountry = 21, NRespondents = 18,112 across all five models. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; se = standard error.  
Models 1–4 are the same as Model 5 with fewer variables and without the interaction effect between ethnic group status and 
income. Model 5: 
fairnessij=β0 + β1fractionalisationj + β2PEIj +  β3GDPj + β4Gallagherj + β5democracyj + β6stabilityj + β7affiliationij 
+ β8genderij + β9log(ageij) + β10groupsizeij + β11educationij + β12mediaattention ij + β13interestij + β14bribesij + 
β15threatsij + β16ethnicityij + β17incomeij + β18(ethnicityij*incomeij) + uj + eij. 




Figure 1: Marginal effect for income on perceived fairness, according to ethnic group status 
 
Note: Dots represent the estimated coefficients of income on perceived fairness among included (0) 





Figure 2: Marginal effects of excluded ethnic group status on fairness for different levels of income 
 
Note: The line represents the estimated coefficient of being in an excluded ethnic group on perceived 
electoral fairness for different levels of income in Model 5 (Table 2), while the grey ribbons indicate 






Table A1: Principal component analysis, electoral fairness 
How often in country's elections: Election officials are fair 0.816 
How often in country's elections: Journalists provide fair coverage of elections 0.619 
How often in country's elections: Votes are counted fairly 0.758 




Table A2: Factor analysis, media consumption 
Information source: Daily newspaper 0.662 
Information source: TV news 0.313 
Information source: Radio news 0.403 
Information source: Internet  0.310 






Table A3: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables, by ethnic group status and overall 
 group status N mean sd median min max 
Fairness included  18,916  0.574 0.239 0.588 0 1 
excluded  3,169  0.534 0.227 0.530 0 1 
total  22,085  0.568 0.238 0.588 0 1 
Income included  18,916  0.414 0.238 0.444 0 1 
excluded  3,169  0.416 0.239 0.444 0 1 
total  22,085  0.414 0.238 0.444 0 1 
Age included  18,916  42.329 16.519 41 18 93 
excluded  3,169  41.092 16.189 39 18 89 
total  22,085  42.151 16.477 40 18 93 
Education included  18,916  0.578 0.313 0.571 0 1 
excluded  3,169  0.539 0.304 0.571 0 1 
total  22,085  0.572 0.312 0.571 0 1 
Media included  18,728  0.592 0.267 0.622 0 1 
excluded  3,127  0.586 0.255 0.613 0 1 
total  21,855  0.591 0.266 0.622 0 1 
Ethnic group 
size  
included  18,912  0.703 0.221 0.801 0.072 0.96 
excluded  3,157  0.189 0.116 0.142 0.002 0.507 
total  22,069 0.629 0.275 0.73 0.002 0.96 
Note: Data from WVS (2016). Limited to respondents of voting age assigned to included and excluded 
ethnic groups with valid values for perceived electoral fairness (n=22,085).  
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics of categorical variables, by ethnic group status and overall 
 
 
group status n % 
Group status Included  18,916 86 
Excluded  3,169 14 
Gender Female included 9,964 53 
excluded 1,653 52 
total 11,617 53 
Male included 8,952 47 
excluded 1,516 48 
total 10,468 47 
Affiliation Winner included 6,620 42 
excluded 1,077 42 
total 7,697 42 
Loser included 7,063 45 
excluded 1,291 51 
total 8,354 46 
Undecided included 2,114 13 
excluded 188 7 
total 2,302 13 
Interest Yes included 8,357 44 
excluded 1,171 37 
total 9,528 43 
No included 10,508 56 
excluded 1,985 63 
total 12,493 57 
Bribes (Very) often included 9,998 53 
excluded 1,686 53 
total 11,684 53 
Not (often) included 8,918 47 
excluded 1,483 47 
total 10,401 47 
Threats (Very) often included 5,244 28 
excluded 919 29 
total 6,163 28 
Not (often) included 13,672 72 
excluded 2,250 71 
total 15,922 72 
Note: Data from WVS (2016). Limited to respondents of voting age assigned to included and 















Algeria 0.40 42.92 5491.61 21.34 2 9 
Australia 0.29 69.97 67646.10 11.29 10 111 
Azerbaijan 0.19 34.90 7189.69 8.25 -7 16 
Brazil 0.52 67.47 11728.80 2.14 8 29 
Colombia 0.41 59.87 7885.06 6.68 7 55 
Estonia 0.47 78.77 17453.75 5.09 9 11 
Georgia 0.34 58.87 4429.65 2.98 7 23 
Kazakhstan 0.53 44.99 12102.69 3.13 -6 20 
Kyrgyzstan 0.54 54.24 1123.88 12.83 7 0 
Malaysia 0.60 35.48 10834.66 10.79 6 4 
Mexico 0.34 57.26 9720.56 6.87 8 15 
Nigeria 0.83 53.17 2514.15 7.87 4 12 
Pakistan 0.64 49.79 1266.38 13.35 6 4 
Peru 0.60 61.80 6389.63 10.23 9 11 
Philippines 0.25 51.65 2604.66 8.98 8 25 
Poland 0.08 74.39 13142.05 5.95 10 21 
Romania 0.19 50.72 8558.40 6.20 9 16 
Taiwan 0.27 73.14 21308 9.07 10 20 
Thailand 0.32 50.75 6225.05 4.92 7 2 
Ukraine 0.37 51.15 3569.76 3.59 6 20 
Uruguay 0.17 75.25 14166.56 1.10 10 26 
Note: 
a  Ethnic fractionalisation, calculated as Herfindahl Index of ethnic group sizes provided in EPR (Vogt 
et al. 2015; see Posner 2004). 
b  Perception of Electoral Integrity Index, based on expert evaluations of various dimensions of the 
electoral process, with 0 indicating low and 100 high electoral integrity (see Norris et al. 2016). 
c  Gross Domestic Product per capita, as reported by the World Bank (2016).  
d The Gallagher Index captures an electoral system’s disproportionality between votes received and 
seats obtained in the legislature (Gallagher 1991); data from (Gallagher 2015). Missing data calculated 
by the authors from the respective election results.  
e  Level of democracy as measured by the Polity2 score in Polity Project (2015). 






Table A6: Determinants of perceived electoral fairness, ethnicity without senior and junior partners 
 M6 







Perceived electoral integrity 
0.13 
(0.16) 


















































Ethnicity * income 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 





Table A7: Determinants of perceived electoral fairness, with economic satisfaction 
 M7 







Perceived electoral integrity 
0.2 
(0.14) 


















































Ethnicity * economic satisfaction 
0.05** 
(0.02) 





Table A8: Determinants of perceived electoral fairness, with life satisfaction 
 M8 







Perceived electoral integrity 
0.2 
(0.14) 


















































Ethnicity * life satisfaction 
0.06** 
(0.02) 













Algeria 42.92 0.44 0.39 *** 
Australia 69.97 0.31 0.43 X 
Azerbaijan 34.90 0.54 0.47 X 
Brazil 67.47 0.35 0.41 *** 
Colombia 59.87 0.39 0.48 *** 
Estonia 78.77 0.36 0.38 X 
Georgia 58.87 0.34 0.29 X 
Kazakhstan 44.99 0.47 0.49 X 
Kyrgyzstan 54.24 0.49 0.52 * 
Malaysia 35.48 0.58 0.56 X 
Mexico 57.26 0.21 0.27 *** 
Nigeria 53.17 0.60 0.43 * 
Pakistan 49.79 0.51 0.52 X 
Peru 61.80 0.37 0.46 * 
Philippines 51.65 0.35 0.32 X 
Poland 74.39 0.42 0.38 X 
Romania 50.72 0.43 0.42 X 
Taiwan 73.14 0.38 0.41 X 
Thailand 50.75 0.00 0.40 *** 
Ukraine 51.15 0.37 0.37 X 
Uruguay 75.25 0.36 0.39 X 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, X = not significant, based on within-country independent 
two-sample t-tests. Income scaled to 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the highest income in country. See 





Table A10: Sensitivity analyses without countries with significant relationships in Table A9 
M5 without: Algeria Brazil Colombia 
Kyrgyzst
an 














































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 17,707 17,716 18,112 16,736 16,721 16,895 18,027 17,056 
Note: NCountry = 20; further see Table 2. 
 
